Leibniz, the problem of regret, and the problem of the essentially damned
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21336087 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeremy W Skrzypek (0000-0002-6506-5919, Ohio Dominican University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 99 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Publication date | 2026-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-7047 • E-ISSN: 1572-8684 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11153-026-09994-4 |
| OpenAlex | W7134164816 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 15 |
The problem of regret is the problem of reconciling the perfect bliss of the blessed in heaven with their desire or wish that things had somehow gone better for the damned. Leibniz’s superessentialism, according to which every event that occurs in the life of a person is essential to that person, provides a unique and robust solution to this problem. But it also entails that those who are damned are essentially damned. What could possibly justify God’s decision to create such persons? In this paper, I argue that Leibniz’s larger metaphysical system has the resources to provide a unique and robust solution to this problem as well
BLISS · Heaven · Metaphysics · Philosophy of religion · Problem of Evil · Regret · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Highly cited | No |
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