What is wrong with exclusivism? Religious exclusivism between epistemic overconfidence and epistemic humility

Bibliographic Data

ID21336183
AuthorsDirk-Martin Grube (0000-0002-5836-8663, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume96
Issue2
Pages109-123
Publication date2024-10-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-7047 • E-ISSN: 1572-8684
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11153-024-09917-1
OpenAlexW4399704670
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited17

I compare the discussion on exclusivism in religion to the discussion on exclusivism in general. With defenders of religious exclusivism, such as Plantinga, I argue that it is a subset of general exclusivism and is as little blameworthy as the latter is. This explains why defenders of religious exclusivism are right in assuming that the burden of proof is on the shoulders of the critics of exclusivism. Yet, this answer solves only part of the problem. It answers only the first order question of whether it is legitimate to hold exclusivist truth claims in religion. It does not answer the second order question of how, in what spirit, they should be held. I argue that there are contexts in which exclusivist truth claims should be held in a humble fashion, for example contexts in which (cognitive) ambiguity reigns. If they are held in those contexts in an overconfident fashion, they are epistemically and/or morally blameworthy. Since religion is characterized by a measure of (cognitive) ambiguity, exclusivist religious truth claims should be held in a humble fashion. They are thus blameworthy if held in an overconfident fashion. Yet, if held in a modest spirit, there is nothing wrong with religious exclusivism

Ambiguity · Epistemology · Philosophy of religion · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access