Ockham on the Side of the Angels
Why a Classical Theist Shouldn't be Moved by Oppy's Argument from Simplicity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21363619 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tyler Dalton Mcnabb (0000-0002-2169-0560, University of Saint Joseph, corresponding author), Michael Devito (0000-0002-8065-1457, University of Birmingham, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 104 |
| Issue | 1110 |
| Pages | 190-194 |
| Publication date | 2023-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | New Blackfriars (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0028-4289 • E-ISSN: 1741-2005 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/nbfr.12766 |
| OpenAlex | W4283512739 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 1 |
A common argument put forth by naturalists (including the prominent philosopher Graham Oppy) in support of naturalism as a worldview over theism, is to claim that naturalism is a simpler hypothesis. Theism posits the existence of everything that naturalism does, plus the existence of a theistic realm. Thus, all things being equal, via Ockham's Razor, naturalism should be preferred to theism. In this essay, we argue that the Classical Theist need not worry about the naturalist's Simplicity argument. Specifically, we argue that, the one holding to a scholastic metaphysics (i.e., potency-act distinction, participatory metaphysics, and existence-in-degree), in the end, will be the one with the simpler worldview
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Naturalism · Realm · Simplicity · Theism · Law · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Highly cited | No |
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