Tropes and qualitative change
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21364058 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul Audi (0000-0001-8652-9893, University of Rochester Rochester NY United States, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 180-201 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Noûs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/nous.12447 |
| OpenAlex | W4319840200 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 66 |
This paper presents the view that tropes can change, and so are not individuated by their determinate qualitative characters. On the view I have in mind, a trope is at any given time fully determinate, but can change qualitatively within the bounds set by a determinable essence. A charge trope, for example, must at any time have some exact intensity, but can survive changes in intensity. My argument, roughly, is this: Objects can change, and tropes are the parts of objects that change (in a special sense of ‘part’), so tropes can change too. After some preliminaries, I present the argument carefully and discuss the operant notions. I then discuss each premise in turn. I respond to the charge that the view isn't realist, and to objections based on identity‐conditions for tropes. I describe both substratum‐ and bundle‐theoretic versions of the view, and finally, show what the view buys us
Aesthetics · Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Identity (music) · Linguistics · Premise · Set (abstract data type) · Trope (literature) · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Resemblance Nominalism
What is a Law of Nature?
Physical Realization
Powerful Qualities, Not Pure Powers
Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology
Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism
Tropes As Character-Grounders
Every Thing Must Go
Relational vs. Constituent Ontologies
On the Need for Properties
Dispositions
Trope theory and the Bradley regress
Mental Causation
The Problem of Free Mass
Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization
Particulars in Particular Clothing
The Individuation of Tropes
How Superduper Does a Physicalist Supervenience Need to Be
The Regress of Pure Powers
Bradley's Regress
Property Identity
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |