Higher‐order being and time

Bibliographic Data

ID21364077
AuthorsLukas Skiba (0000-0003-1670-8524, Department of Philosophy University of Bergen Bergen Norway, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume59
Issue2
Pages464-494
Publication date2025-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueNoûs (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12509
OpenAlexW4400798333
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited55

Higher‐order metaphysicians take facts to be higher‐order beings, i.e., entities in the range of irreducibly higher‐order quantifiers. In this paper, I investigate the impact of this conception of facts on the debate about the reality of tense. I identify two major repercussions. The first concerns the logical space of tense realism: on a higher‐order conception of facts, a prominent version of tense realism, dynamic absolutism, turns out to conflict with the laws of (higher‐order tense) logic. The second concerns our understanding of the positions occupying this logical space: on a higher‐order conception of facts, an attractive interpretation of the central tense realist notion of ‘facts constituting reality’ becomes unavailable. I discuss these results in the context of the more general project of higher‐order metaphysics and the (meta)metaphysics of time, drawing out their implications for the nature of the disputes both between realists and anti‐realists about tense and between different tense realist factions

Economics · Order (exchange) · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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