Chalmers v Chalmers

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21364224
AutoresDaniel Stoljar (0000-0003-4506-3614, Australian National University, autor correspondente)
Ano2020
Volume54
Fascículo2
Páginas469-487
Data de publicação2020-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoNoûs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12334
OpenAlexW3022068347
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas16

This paper brings out an inconsistency between David Chalmers's dualism, which is the main element of his philosophy of mind, and his structuralism, which is the main element of his epistemology. The point is ad hominem , but the inconsistency if it can be established is of considerable independent interest. For the best response to the inconsistency, I argue, is to adopt what Chalmers calls ‘type‐C Materialism’, a version of materialism that has been much discussed in recent times because of its promise to move us beyond the stand‐off between standard versions of materialism and dualism. In turn, if that version of materialism is true, both dualism and structuralism should be rejected

Dualism · Element (criminal law) · Epistemology · Historical materialism · Marxist philosophy · Materialism · Political science · Structuralism (philosophy of science) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science