Political Economy of Discretionary Allocation of Annual Development Programmes
Theory and Evidence from Balochistan
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21368058 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Manzoor Ahmed (0000-0003-1507-9332, University of Balochistan, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Pages | 167-198 |
| Publication date | 2023-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Pakistan Development Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0030-9729 |
| Publisher | Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PUBLISHER • PK) |
| DOI | 10.30541/v62i2pp.167-198 |
| OpenAlex | W4392525333 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 21 |
This article discusses and analyses the presence of discretionary allocations of annual development programmes (ADP)—the annual development budget—in the Balochistan province of Pakistan. The paper builds a strong theory and uses robust empirical techniques to assess how the political and bureaucratic elite discretionarily and disproportionally allocates the development funds to meet two central objectives: First, to allow misappropriation of the development funds to their benefit; and second, to make constituency/district-specific allocations to buy political allegiance, indulge in pork-barrel and promote patronage politics— clientelism. For empirical assessment, the article applies an unbalanced panel dataset for districts from the provincial level sources. The theoretical propositions and the empirical results show a presence of discretion and clientelism in the process of budget making and projects’ allocation to districts/constituencies, for incumbent politicians and senior career officials in charge of the budgetary-making process make disproportionate budgetary allocations in ADP to their home districts or constituencies or the projects with leverage of extraction and kickbacks in the process of allocations, bidding, and execution. It is evident that constituencies or districts, without representation in the government/cabinet and/or senior bureaucracy in the ministries that make public policy, receive far lesser budgetary allocations than their proportionate share, notwithstanding their prevailing poor social and economic landscape. Such discretionary allocations suffice personal interests and support clientelism in resource sharing, creating inter-regions and inter-districts/constituencies disparity in terms of economic and social development within the province
Economic system · Economics · Economy · Political science · Politics · Gender, Education, and Development Issues · International Development and Aid · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
Econometric Analysis of Panel Data
The Politics of Government Decision-Making
Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels
Why Nations Fail
A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
Specification Tests in Econometrics
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
Political Order and Political Decay
Institutional change and economic performance
The system of administrative and political corruption
Karez irrigation in Pakistan
The Risk of Resource Misappropriation in Community-Driven Development
Pro-poor targeting and accountability of local governments in West Bengal
School subsidies for the poor
Unfair Distribution of Resources in Africa
Decentralisation and Accountability in Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries
Return of a King
Land Reforms at Centre Stage
Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters
Inequality and Regime Change
The Dynamics of (Ethno)Nationalism and Federalism in Postcolonial Balochistan, Pakistan
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |