In defense of moderation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21370688 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jacob Barrett (0000-0002-7342-4213, Vanderbilt University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Publication date | 2026-07-06 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-026-02579-x |
| OpenAlex | W7167517559 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 29 |
A decision theory is fanatical if it says that, for any sure thing of getting some finite amount of value, it would be better to almost certainly get nothing while having some tiny probability (no matter how small) of getting sufficiently more finite value. Fanaticism is extremely counterintuitive; common sense requires a more moderate view. However, a recent slew of arguments purport to vindicate it, claiming that moderate alternatives to fanaticism are sometimes similarly counterintuitive, face a powerful continuum argument, and violate widely accepted synchronic and diachronic consistency conditions. In this paper, I defend moderation. I show that certain arguments for fanaticism raise trouble for some versions of moderation—but not for more plausible moderate approaches. Other arguments raise more general difficulties for moderates—but fanatics face these problems too. There is therefore little reason to doubt our commonsensical commitment to moderation, and we can rest easy not worrying too much about tiny probabilities of enormous value
Consistency (knowledge bases) · Face (sociological concept) · Fanaticism · Great Moderation · Moderation · Nothing · Philosophy of mind · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Risk and Rationality
Rationality and Dynamic Choice
The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk
Problems of Population Theory Obligations to Future Generations . R. I. Sikora , Brian Barry
Decision Theory and De Minimis Risk
Egyptology and fanaticism
On the desire to make a difference
A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values
Expected value, to a point
On two arguments for fanaticism
On the Offense against Fanaticism
In Defense of Fanaticism
Average Utilitarianism Implies Solipsistic Egoism
Are Spectrum Arguments Defused by Vagueness
Saving Fanaticism
Reasons and Persons
Infinite Prospects
Probability discounting and money pumps
Moral Vagueness Is Ontic Vagueness
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |