On two arguments for fanaticism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21364043 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jack S Russell (0000-0003-3135-8120, University of Southern California, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 565-595 |
| Publication date | 2024-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Noûs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/nous.12461 |
| OpenAlex | W4379259451 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 14 |
| References cited | 33 |
Should we make significant sacrifices to ever‐so‐slightly lower the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever‐so‐slightly raise the chance of extremely good outcomes? Fanaticism says yes: for every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance of an enormous good that is even better. I evaluate the prospects for Fanaticism, in connection with two other kinds of general ethical principles. First, separability principles, which say that which option is best does not depend in strange ways on what might be going on in distant space and time—jumping off from a recent argument for Fanaticism from Beckstead and Thomas (2023). Second, reflection principles, about how gaining new information makes a difference to which options are best—jumping off from a recent argument for Fanaticism from Wilkinson (2022). It turns out that the situation is unstable: plausible general separability and reflection principles actually tell against Fanaticism, but restrictions of those same principles (with strengthened auxiliary assumptions) support Fanaticism. All of the consistent views that emerge are very strange
Argument (complex analysis) · Economics · Epistemology · Fanaticism · Mathematical economics · Outcome (game theory) · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Reflection (computer programming) · Space (punctuation) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology
Fixing Stochastic Dominance
Absolutism vs. comparativism about value
Expected choiceworthiness and fanaticism
In defense of moderation
Egyptology and fanaticism
Aggregation and the Structure of Value
Expected value, to a point
Infinite ethics and the limits of impartiality
Moral Uncertainty, Pure Justifiers, and Agent-Centred Options
Saving Fanaticism
Against anti‐fanaticism
Probability discounting and money pumps
The structure of critical sets
A Dominance Argument Against Incompleteness
Risk and Rationality
The Possibility of Parity
Problems of Population Theory Obligations to Future Generations . R. I. Sikora , Brian Barry
Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom
Weighing Goods
Weighing Lives
The case for comparability
A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values
In Defense of Fanaticism
Decision Making in the Face of Parity
Astronomical Waste
Infinite lotteries, large and small sets
Moral demands and the far future
Infinite Prospects
Rethinking the GoodMoral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning
| Unique citing works | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4.67 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 13 |