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Fixing Stochastic Dominance

Bibliographic Data

ID8398963
AuthorsJack S Russell (0000-0003-3135-8120, University of Southern California, corresponding author), Jeffrey Sanford Russell (University of Southern California)
Year2023
Volume77
Issue3
Pages701-725
Publication date2023-11-29
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/728716
OpenAlexW4390066055
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited21

Decision theorists widely accept a stochastic dominance principle: roughly, if a risky prospect A is at least as probable as another prospect B to result in something at least as good, then A is at least as good as B. Recently, philosophers have applied this principle even in contexts where the values of possible outcomes do not have the structure of the real numbers: this includes cases of incommensurable values and cases of infinite values. But in these contexts the usual formulation of stochastic dominance is wrong. We show this with several counterexamples. Still, the motivating idea behind stochastic dominance is a good one: it is supposed to provide a way of applying dominance reasoning in the stochastic context of probability distributions. We give two new formulations of stochastic dominance that are more faithful to this guiding idea, and prove that they are equivalent

Dominance (genetics · Download · Epistemology · Philosophy of science · Sociology · World Wide Web · Chemistry · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science

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Unique citing works4
Citations per year1.33
Citation span2023 - 2025 (3)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 4

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