Fictional names, theoretical names, and indeterminate existence

Bibliographic Data

ID21370945
AuthorsAlex Fisher (0000-0002-7448-025X)
Year2026
Volume183
Issue5
Pages1465-1481
Publication date2026-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11098-026-02497-y
OpenAlexW7131630595
LanguageEN
References cited54

Creationism about fictional and theoretical names holds that seemingly empty names such as ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘Vulcan’ refer to abstract objects created by authors and scientific theorists. This paper poses an objection to creationism: in cases of fiction writing or scientific theorising where it is indeterminate whether one succeeds or fails in referring to an object in the world, creationism renders it metaphysically indeterminate whether an abstract object is created. However, the indeterminate existence of abstract objects constitutes an untenable metaphysical commitment, offering a compelling reason to reject creationism

Creationism · Indeterminate · Metaphysics · Object (grammar) · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Evolution and Science Education · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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