Desire and motivation in desire theories of well-being
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21371045 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Atus Mariqueo-Russell (0000-0002-6640-322X, University of Southampton, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 180 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 1975-1994 |
| Publication date | 2023-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-023-01966-y |
| OpenAlex | W4381806311 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 40 |
Desire theories of well-being claim that how well our life goes for us is solely determined by the fulfilment and frustration of our desires. Several writers have argued that these theories are incorrect because they fail to capture the harms of self-sacrifice and severe depression. In this paper, I argue that desire theories of well-being can account for the harm of both phenomena by rejecting proportionalism about desire and motivation. This is the view that desires always motivate proportionally to their strength. If we reject this view, then we can explain the harm of many cases of self-sacrifice as arising when we act upon our weaker desires and thereby frustrate our stronger desires. Moreover, the harm of many cases of severe depression can be explained by its suppression of the motivational force of desires. This inevitably frustrates desires that we are left unmotivated to fulfil. I argue that this approach captures the experiential quality of self-sacrifice and severe depression better than rival views that seek to problematise these phenomena for desire theories of well-being. Moreover, these theories have sufficient conceptual resources to account for residual cases of self-sacrifice and severe depression that are less well explained by this approach
Epistemology · Experiential learning · Harm · Metaphysics · Psychotherapist · Sacrifice · Well-being · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
Well-Being, Depression, and Desire
Digital Natives’ Intentions Toward Informal Digital English Learning
Leveraging Machine Learning Approach to Identify the Predictors of Informal Digital Learning of English Behaviours Among EFL Learners
Examining the life satisfaction, behavioural intentions, and well-being of scuba divers
Well-being and the Problem of Unstable Desires
Dead Sea Apple Cases of Disappointment
Touching the Earth
The Philosophy of Well-Being
Three Faces of Desire
Desiring the Bad
Well‐being and Time
A Theory of Justice
A paradox for some theories of welfare
Moral Saints
Adaptive Preference
Well-Being and the Priority of Values
Preferentism and the Paradox of Desire
Humean Externalism and the Argument from Depression
Depression and the Problem of Absent Desires
Slaves of the Passions
Desire as Belief
Anger and Forgiveness
Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death
Subjectivism without Desire
Affective and Non-Affective Desire
Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer
Desire Satisfactionism and Time
Moral Realism
The problem of defective desires
Preferentism and Self‐sacrifice
Finite and Infinite Goods
Changing Direction on Direction of Fit
Desires Are Not Propositional Attitudes
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |