Accuracy, probabilism, and the insufficiency of the alethic

Bibliographic Data

ID21371192
AuthorsCorey Dethier (0000-0002-1240-8391, Leibniz University Hannover, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume179
Issue7
Pages2285-2301
Publication date2022-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11098-021-01763-5
OpenAlexW4200050230
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited26

The best and most popular argument for probabilism is the accuracy-dominance argument, which purports to show that alethic considerations alone support the view that an agent’s degrees of belief should always obey the axioms of probability. I argue that extant versions of the accuracy-dominance argument face a problem. In order for the mathematics of the argument to function as advertised, we must assume that every omniscient credence function is classically consistent; there can be no worlds in the set of dominance-relevant worlds that obey some other logic. This restriction cannot be motivated on alethic grounds unless we’re also willing to accept that rationality requires belief in every metaphysical necessity, as the distinction between a priori logical necessities and a posteriori metaphysical ones is not an alethic distinction. To justify the restriction to classically consistent worlds, non-alethic motivation is required. And thus, if there is a version of the accuracy-dominance argument in support of probabilism, it isn’t one that is grounded in alethic considerations alone

A priori and a posteriori · Argument (complex analysis) · Dominance (genetics) · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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