Simone Weil on "Force" and the Possibilities of Human Freedom

In this article we argue that Simone Weil offers an account of human freedom that—if and when it emerges—emerges from the human being’s recognition of, and appropriate response to, the impossibility of eliminating “force.” While other commentators have noted that for Weil, our freedom derives from consenting spontaneously to that which necessity obligates, we go further by showing the ways in which our responses to force are historically inscribed by the trauma of previous responses, and the ways this impedes our ability to come to terms with (or in Weil’s language, “consent” to) force. We maintain that, despite the ineliminability of force and the trauma and repetition of response it tends to incite, human freedom is still possible under Weil’s account, so long as we also recognize our obligation to one another as human beings

Action (physics) · Human rights · Humiliation · Impossibility · Inscribed figure · Obligation · Borges, Kipling, and Jewish Identity · Diverse academic research themes · Philosophy and Literary Analysis