Veritism and the normativity of logic
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21379175 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nader Shoaibi (0000-0002-4313-0353, Department of Philosophy and Religion University of Indianapolis 1400 E Hanna Ave. Indianapolis IN 46227 USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 7-19 |
| Publication date | 2021-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ratio (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-0006 • E-ISSN: 1467-9329 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/rati.12289 |
| OpenAlex | W3085713051 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 28 |
The idea that logic is in some sense normative for thought and reasoning is a familiar one. Some of the most prominent figures in the history of philosophy including Kant and Frege have been among its defenders. The most natural way of spelling out this idea is to formulate wide‐scope deductive requirements on belief which rule out certain states as irrational. But what can account for the truth of such deductive requirements of rationality? By far, the most prominent responses draw in one way or another on the idea that belief aims at the truth . In this paper, I consider two ways of making this line of thought more precise and I argue that they both fail. In particular, I examine a recent attempt by Epistemic Utility Theory to give a veritist account of deductive coherence requirements. I argue that despite its proponents’ best efforts, Epistemic Utility Theory cannot vindicate such requirements
Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) · Deductive reasoning · Epistemology · Irrational number · Normative · Rationality · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citations per year | 0.4 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2022 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |