Locke on Conditional Threats

Bibliographic Data

ID21395220
AuthorsLuciano Venezia (0000-0002-7647-7775, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume60
Issue4
Pages696-713
Publication date2022-12-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Southern Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0038-4283 • E-ISSN: 2041-6962
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/sjp.12460
OpenAlexW4225407764
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited25

John Locke says that a victim is permitted to kill a Conditional Threat in self‐defense. Yet, David Rodin argues that killing is disproportionate to the harm averted and is therefore impermissible. But Rodin mischaracterizes the situation faced by a Conditional Threat victim as analyzed by Locke. In this article, I aim to provide a more satisfactory reading of Locke on self‐defense against Conditional Threats, particularly of the thesis that killing involves a proportionate response to the harm averted. In addition to this, I also aim to further elaborate and defend Locke's view. First, I show that a Conditional Threat deprives his victim of her freedom to act as she thinks fit, without having to depend on the Conditional Threat's arbitrary will. Second, I argue that an interest in not being deprived of one's freedom to act as one thinks fit, without having to depend on another person's arbitrary will, by a conditional threat of deadly harm, is of sufficient value to make killing a proportionate act, especially if the person is highly morally culpable. If killing also meets the necessity condition of justified self‐defense (admittedly, a big “if”), it follows that Locke, not Rodin, holds the correct view

Epistemology · Harm · Law and economics · Political science · Sociology · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Torture, Ethics, and Law · War, Ethics, and Justification

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