Sufficiency and freedom in Locke’s theory of property
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6259811 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Layman (0000-0002-3099-1103, John Brown University, corresponding author), Daniel M Layman (Brown University) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 152-173 |
| Publication date | 2018-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Political Theory (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1474-8851 • E-ISSN: 1741-2730 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885115587118 |
| OpenAlex | W2361166468 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
It is traditional to ascribe to Locke the view that every person who acquires natural property rights by labouring on resources is obligated to leave sufficient resources for everyone else. But during the last several decades, a number of authors have contributed to a compelling textual case against this reading. Nevertheless, Locke clearly indicates that there is something wrong with distributions in which some suffer while others thrive. But if he does not endorse the traditional proviso, what exactly is the problem? In this paper, I offer a solution to this puzzle. I argue that according to Locke, once people use their natural rights to acquire large properties, many individuals are unable to enjoy the material and moral wellbeing, or “preservation,” that is the end of natural law. For even if such large properties pose no problem for material preservation, they foster arbitrary power that offends against moral preservation
Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Natural (archaeology · Natural law · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Private property · Property (philosophy · Property rights · Reading (process · Sociology · State of nature · American Constitutional Law and Politics · History · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Citations per year | 0.57 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Highly cited | No |