Are the Folk Functionalists About Time

Bibliographic Data

ID21395244
AuthorsAndrew J Latham (0000-0001-8639-8053), Kristie Miller (0000-0002-5092-8419, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume60
Issue2
Pages221-248
Publication date2022-06-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Southern Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0038-4283 • E-ISSN: 2041-6962
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/sjp.12441
OpenAlexW3209051665
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited29

This article empirically investigates the contention that the folk concept of time is a functional concept: a concept according to which time is whatever plays a certain functional role or roles. This hypothesis could explain why, in previous research, surprisingly large percentages of participants judge that there is time at worlds that contain no one‐dimensional substructure of ordered instants. If it seems to participants that even in those worlds the relevant functional role is played, then this could explain why they judge that there is time in those worlds. While our experiment supported the finding that participants are reticent to judge that there is actually no time, we found no evidence that this is because they deploy a functionalist concept, at least of the kind proposed in recent research. Our findings are, however, consistent with the folk deploying a much more minimal functionalist concept according to which time is just whatever it is—regardless of its nature—that plays the role of grounding our temporal phenomenology

Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Folk psychology · Functionalism (philosophy of mind) · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Sociology · Structural functionalism · Categorization, perception, and language · Child and Animal Learning Development · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Representations and Identity

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