Against Universal Epistemic Instrumentalism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21408816 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James Bernard Willoughby (0000-0002-3458-1777, Australian National University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 589-605 |
| Publication date | 2022-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Canadian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0045-5091 • E-ISSN: 1911-0820 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/can.2022.45 |
| OpenAlex | W4322771048 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 30 |
Beliefs should conform to some norms. Epistemic instrumentalism holds that your beliefs should conform to these epistemic norms just because conforming is useful. But there seems to be cases where conforming to the epistemic norms isn’t useful at all, as in so-called “too-few-reasons” cases. In response to these cases, universal epistemic instrumentalists argue that despite first appearances, it is always useful to conform to the epistemic norms. I argue that all current versions of this universalist response are objectionable. I conclude with a conjecture about why no version of universalism will succeed
Epistemology · Instrumentalism · Political science · Universalism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
Ethics
The Theory of Epistemic Rationality
The Myth of Morality
Taking Morality Seriously
The Philosophy of Philosophy
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds
Being Realistic about Reasons
Normativity
Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons
Chris Cowie, Morality and Epistemic Judgement, (OUP), 2019
Could our epistemic reasons be collective practical reasons
Pundits and Possibilities
Epistemology Naturalized
The Nature of Rationality
Slaves of the Passions
Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief
Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence
Epistemic normativity
In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity
Laudan's normative naturalism
Aim-less epistemology
The Game of Belief
Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality
Evidence and Normativity
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |