Clearing up Clouds

Underspecification in Demonstrative Communication

Bibliographic Data

ID21409017
AuthorsRichard Harder (0000-0003-4536-6236, University of Toronto, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume53
Issue1
Pages38-59
Publication date2023-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCanadian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0045-5091 • E-ISSN: 1911-0820
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/can.2023.26
OpenAlexW4387024138
LanguageEN
References cited36

This paper explains how an assertion may be understood despite there being nothing said or meant by the assertion. That such understanding is possible is revealed by cases of the so-called “felicitous underspecification” of demonstratives: cases where there is understanding of an assertion containing a demonstrative despite the interlocutors not settling on one or another object as the one the speaker is talking about (King 2014a, 2017, 2021). I begin by showing how Stalnaker’s ([1978] 1999) well-known pragmatic principles adequately permit and constrain the felicitous underspecification of demonstratives. I then establish a connection between the satisfaction of Stalnaker’s principles and understanding, and show how that connection sheds further light on the relevant cases. After developing and motivating my proposal, I address some objections to it, then briefly discuss the felicitous underspecification of expressions other than demonstratives alongside contrasting my proposal with a similar one from Bowker (2015, 2019) that concerns definite descriptions

Assertion · Demonstrative · Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Underspecification · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation

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