La epistemología naturalizada

Bibliographic Data

ID21435877
AuthorsClaudio Cormick (0000-0003-0162-2429, Instituto de Filosofía, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume29
Issue62
Pages101-122
Publication date2021-04-30
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEscritos (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0120-1263 • E-ISSN: 2390-0032
PublisherUniversidad Pontificia Bolivariana (PUBLISHER • CO)
DOI10.18566/escr.v29n62.a07
OpenAlexW3160919569
LanguageES
References cited35

The article presents a brief reconstruction of naturalized epistemology, understood as a methodological approach. Three emblematic positions within naturalized epistemology are distinguished: rejection of apriorism inepistemology, favoring the use of the results of empirical science; attribution of an instrumental normativity to epistemology; and the thesis of the empirical assessability of the epistemic norms or principles. The text addresses the way in which, historically, these features are presented in the foundational works of Quine and Laudan. Furthermore, it studies how this project is applied by three authors: Howard Sankey, who links naturalism to the debate of epistemic relativism; and Louise Antony and Elizabeth Anderson, who make use of these ideas as a foundation for feminist epistemology. Through these “applications”, it is possible to appreciate that naturalizedepistemology does not lead to the elimination of normative aspects, as was feared by early critics of Quine. It is also possible to appreciate that the approach of Sankey is naturalized because it is empirically informed, but it still depends on a priori arguments. On the contrary, appropriations by feminist epistemology carry out the naturalization project in a deeper sense, that is, they introduce a set of epistemological premises that are themselves empirical

Epistemology · Humanities · Quine · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access