Premise-based vs conclusion-based collective choice
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21470613 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Masaki Miyashita (0000-0002-9812-4225, Yale University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 361-385 |
| Publication date | 2021-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Choice and Welfare (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0176-1714 • E-ISSN: 1432-217X |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s00355-021-01319-w |
| OpenAlex | W3139256156 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 22 |
Epistemology · Generalization · Infinity · Majority rule · Mathematical economics · Political science · Premise · Salient · Voting · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Artificial Intelligence
Unpacking the Court
Aggregating Sets of Judgments
Agenda manipulation under doctrinal paradox
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth
Democratic Answers to Complex Questions – An Epistemic Perspective
The Ostrogorski Paradox
The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |