Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

Bibliographic Data

ID19038693
Authorsİrem Bozbay, Franz Dietrich (0000-0001-5300-0109, corresponding author), Hans Peters (0000-0003-1441-7512)
Year2014
Volume87
Pages571-590
Publication date2014-02-26
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueGames and Economic Behavior (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0899-8256 • E-ISSN: 1090-2473
PublisherElsevier BV (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.007
OpenAlexW2171333164
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited30

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota

Aggregation problem · Data mining · Economics · Epistemology · Incentive · Information aggregation · Microeconomics · Political science · Preference · Private information retrieval · Social choice theory · Voting · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Artificial Intelligence

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