Jury Verdicts and Preference Diversity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3368138 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dino Gerardi (0000-0003-0577-178X, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 94 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 395-406 |
| Publication date | 2000-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2586019 |
| OpenAlex | W2318234034 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 14 |
I develop a model of decision making in juries when there is uncertainty about jurors' preferences. I provide a characterization of the equilibrium strategy under any voting rule and show that nonunanimous rules are asymptotically efficient. Specifically, large juries make the correct decision with probability close to one. My analysis also demonstrates that under the unanimous rule, large juries almost never convict the defendant. The last result contrasts markedly with the literature and suggests that the unanimity rule can protect the innocent only at the price of acquitting the guilty
Characterization (materials science · Convict · Diversity (politics · Economics · Jury · Law and economics · Majority rule · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Preference · Rationality · Unanimity · Voting · Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
Natural resources and violent conflict
Democratic Deliberation Within
Reflective Democracy
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth
Anonymous Procedures for Condorcet’s Model
Epistemic Democracy
Optimal committee design and political participation
Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
The optimal jury size when jury deliberation follows a random walk
Deliberation in large juries with diverse preferences
Get Rid of Unanimity Rule
On the Significance of the Absolute Margin
Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
The American jury
Group decision and social interaction
The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts
Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents
Rousseau's General Will
Convicting the Innocent
Condorcet's Theory of Voting
| Citations per year | 0.48 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2001 - 2017 (17) |
| Highly cited | No |