The Banks set and the bipartisan set may be disjoint
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21470637 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Felix Brandt (0000-0002-4179-9897, Technical University of Munich, corresponding author), Florian Grundbacher (Technical University of Munich) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 349-355 |
| Publication date | 2026-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Choice and Welfare (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0176-1714 • E-ISSN: 1432-217X |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s00355-025-01608-8 |
| OpenAlex | W4410934413 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 16 |
Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. We construct a tournament of order 36 that can be partitioned into the Banks set and the bipartisan set. As a consequence, the Banks set, as well as its refinements, such as the minimal extending set and the tournament equilibrium set, can be disjoint from the bipartisan set
Discrete mathematics · Disjoint sets · Economics · International political economy · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Political science · Programming language · Public finance · Social policy · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Computer Science · European Monetary and Fiscal Policies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics
| Highly cited | No |
|---|