Mental imagery through the lens of aphantasia

Bibliographic Data

ID21502019
AuthorsChristian O Scholz (0009-0008-7413-3267, Institut für Philosophie II Ruhr‐Universität Bochum Bochum Germany, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume40
Issue3
Pages317-324
Publication date2025-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueMind & Language (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0268-1064 • E-ISSN: 1468-0017
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/mila.12560
OpenAlexW4410381822
LanguageEN
References cited38

In his recent book Mental imagery: Philosophy, psychology, neuroscience , Nanay presents a far‐reaching empirically grounded account of mental imagery. This commentary focuses on Nanay's proposal that individuals with aphantasia, a cognitive norm variant characterized by an absence of imagery experience, have unconscious mental imagery. Recent empirical findings on aphantasia are reviewed, and evidence both for and against voluntary and involuntary unconscious mental imagery in aphantasia is discussed in the context of Nanay's general account of mental imagery and its taxonomy. It is argued that people with aphantasia, contrary to Nanay's proposal, do not possess unconscious mental imagery

Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Mental image · Optics · Through-the-lens metering · Face Recognition and Perception · Multisensory perception and integration · Neuroscience · Psychology · Visual perception and processing mechanisms

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