On the impairment argument
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21504356 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William Simkulet (0000-0002-4474-9713, Park University Parkville Missouri, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 400-406 |
| Publication date | 2021-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Bioethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0269-9702 • E-ISSN: 1467-8519 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/bioe.12844 |
| PMID | 33527428 |
| OpenAlex | W3128316352 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
Most opposition to abortion stands or falls on whether a fetus is the sort of being whose life it is seriously wrong to end. In her influential paper ‘A defense of abortion,’ Judith Jarvis Thomson effectively sidesteps this issue, assuming the fetus is a person with the right to life yet arguing this alone does not give it the right to use the mother’s body. In a recent article, Perry Hendricks takes inspiration from Thomson and assumes the fetus is not a person, arguing that abortion is wrong because causing fetal impairment is wrong and abortion is worse than causing fetal impairment. Here I argue Hendricks’ impairment argument fails. For Hendricks, risking fetal impairment is wrong because it risks harm to a future person, but if we assume the fetus is not a person, abortion doesn’t harm anyone, it merely prevents them from existing
Abortion · Fetus · Harm · Harm principle · Personhood · Political science · Politics · Pregnancy · Ethics and Legal Issues in Pediatric Healthcare · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Medicine · Psychology · Reproductive Health and Technologies · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2024 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |