Kant and the enhancement debate
Imperfect duties and perfecting ourselves
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21504517 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brian A Chance (0000-0002-9798-3650, Humanities Department Oklahoma School of Science and Mathematics Oklahoma City Oklahoma, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 801-811 |
| Publication date | 2021-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Bioethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0269-9702 • E-ISSN: 1467-8519 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/bioe.12906 |
| PMID | 34219253 |
| OpenAlex | W3177525869 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
This essay develops a Kantian approach to the permissibility of biomedical physical, cognitive, and moral enhancement. Kant holds that human beings have an imperfect duty to promote their physical, cognitive, and moral perfection. While an agent’s individual circumstances may limit the means she may permissibly use to enhance herself, whether biomedically or otherwise, I argue (1) that biomedical means of enhancing oneself are, generally speaking, both permissible and meritorious from a Kantian perspective. Despite often being equally permissible, I also argue (2) that enhancing oneself by more traditional means is, generally speaking, more meritorious (and involves the display of more virtue) than enhancing oneself by biomedical means. Nevertheless, since Kant does not fault agents for acting less meritoriously (or for displaying less virtue) than they otherwise could, I also argue (3) that those who opt for permissible biomedical enhancement over more traditional forms are not blameworthy for doing so. I also consider and reject several objections to these claims, including that biomedical enhancements (1) are too passive to count as actions by the agent who enhances herself, (2) involve a failure of the agent to treat her humanity as an end in itself or to show proper respect for her dignity, (3) might be undertaken on the basis of motives that undermine their permissibility, (4) are likely to exacerbate existing social and economic inequalities in ways that do the same, and (5) in their moral form are incompatible with Kant’s conception of duty and human freedom
Categorical imperative · Dignity · Duty · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Human enhancement · Humanity · Imperfect · Kantian ethics · Law and economics · Morality · Perfection · Political science · Practical reason · Sociology · Virtue · Virtue ethics · Computer Science · Law · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Patient Dignity and Privacy · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |