Why the wrongness of intentionally impairing children in utero does not imply the wrongness of abortion
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21513877 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Simon Cushing (0000-0002-2956-8586, Philosophy, University of Michigan, Flint, Michigan, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 146-147 |
| Publication date | 2023-02-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Medical Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0306-6800 • E-ISSN: 1473-4257 |
| Publisher | BMJ (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1136/jme-2022-108583 |
| PMID | 36693707 |
| OpenAlex | W4294631147 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 4 |
Perry Hendricks’ ‘impairment argument’, which he has defended in this journal, is intended to demonstrate that the generally conceded wrongness of giving a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) shows that abortion must also be immoral, even if we allow that the fetus is not a rights-bearing moral person. The argument fails because the harm of causing FAS is extrinsic but Hendricks needs it to be intrinsic for it to show anything about abortion. Either the subject of the wrong of causing FAS is a person who does not exist in the case of abortion or the wrong is negligible
Abortion · Biology · Developmental psychology · Fetal alcohol syndrome · Fetus · Harm · In utero · Obstetrics · Pregnancy · Psychiatry · Ethics and Legal Issues in Pediatric Healthcare · Ethics in medical practice · Medicine · Psychology · Reproductive Health and Technologies · Social Psychology · Endocrinology
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |