Strengthened impairment argument does not restate Marquis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21514249 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bruce P Blackshaw (0000-0002-9115-582X, University of Birmingham, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 12 |
| Pages | 841-842 |
| Publication date | 2021-12-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Medical Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0306-6800 • E-ISSN: 1473-4257 |
| Publisher | BMJ (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1136/medethics-2021-107302 |
| PMID | 33687914 |
| OpenAlex | W3135281338 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 5 |
With Perry Hendricks, I recently outlined a strengthened version of the impairment argument (SIA) for the immorality of abortion. Alex Gillham has argued that our use of Don Marquis’ deprivation of a ‘future-like ours’ account entails we were merely restating Marquis’ argument for the immorality of abortion. Here, I explain why SIA is more than just a reframing of Marquis
Abortion · Biology · Cognitive reframing · Epistemology · Immorality · Law and economics · Morality · Personhood · Pregnancy · Sociology · Medicine · Philosophy · Psychology · Reproductive Health and Technologies · Social Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|