Against the strengthened impairment argument

Never-born fetuses have no FLO to deprive

Bibliographic Data

ID21515166
AuthorsAlex R Gillham (0000-0003-2234-6945, Department of Philosophy, Saint Bonaventure University, Saint Bonaventure, New York, USA, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume47
Issue12
Pagese43-e43
Publication date2021-12-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Medical Ethics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0306-6800 • E-ISSN: 1473-4257
PublisherBMJ (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1136/medethics-2020-106579
PMID32839231
OpenAlexW3080582557
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited11

In order for the so-called strengthened impairment argument (SIA) to succeed, it must posit some reason R that causing fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) is immoral, one that also holds in cases of abortion. In formulating SIA, Blackshaw and Hendricks borrow from Don Marquis to claim that the reason R that causing FAS is immoral lies in the fact that it deprives an organism of a future like ours (an FLO). I argue here that SIA fails to show that it is immoral to cause FAS and abort fetuses that will not be born because it deprives them of an FLO. This is because fetuses that will not be born have no chance of having an FLO in the first place, so causing FAS for and aborting them cannot deprive them of one. I then consider three responses to my argument. I conclude that each fails. SIA does not accomplish its task of showing why it is immoral to impair fetuses that will not be born. Perhaps it can accomplish the task of showing why it is immoral to impair fetuses that will be born, but not without sacrificing at least some of its alleged significance

Abortion · Biology · Economics · Fetal alcohol syndrome · Fetus · Law and economics · Personhood · Political science · Pregnancy · Sociology · Law · Medicine · Philosophy · Prenatal Substance Exposure Effects · Psychology · Genetics

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