Impairing the impairment argument

Bibliographic Data

ID21515258
AuthorsKyle Van Oosterum (0000-0002-6373-5368, University of Oxford), E Curran (0000-0002-2247-0156, University of Cambridge, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume50
Issue5
Pages335-339
Publication date2024-05-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Medical Ethics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0306-6800 • E-ISSN: 1473-4257
PublisherBMJ (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1136/jme-2023-109162
PMID37380338
OpenAlexW4382395147
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited16

Blackshaw and Hendricks have recently developed and defended the impairment argument against abortion, arguing that the immorality of giving a child fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) provides us with reason to believe that abortion is immoral. In this paper, we forward two criticisms of the impairment argument. First, we highlight that, as it currently stands, the argument is very weak and accomplishes very little. Second, we argue that Blackshaw and Hendricks are fundamentally mistaken about what makes giving a child FAS immoral. Once we acknowledge this, it is clear that our intuitions about giving a child FAS provide no support for the supposed immorality of abortion

Abortion · Epistemology · Fetal alcohol syndrome · Immorality · Morality · Personhood · Pregnancy · Psychoanalysis · Medicine · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Organ Donation and Transplantation · Philosophy · Psychology · Reproductive Health and Technologies

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