Defending the impairment argument
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21515039 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bruce P Blackshaw (0000-0002-9115-582X, University of Birmingham, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 342-344 |
| Publication date | 2024-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Medical Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0306-6800 • E-ISSN: 1473-4257 |
| Publisher | BMJ (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1136/jme-2023-109416 |
| PMID | 37586833 |
| OpenAlex | W4385879121 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 7 |
Kyle van Oosterum and Emma Curran have recently argued that the impairment argument against abortion is weak and accomplishes little. They also claim that impairment fails to explain what makes giving a child fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) immoral, which is an important premise of the argument. Here, I explain that the impairment argument is not as weak as they believe. Further, I argue that impairment offers a superior explanation for what makes giving a child FAS immoral than their proposal based on creative beneficence
Abortion · Epistemology · Pregnancy · Premise · Ethics and Legal Issues in Pediatric Healthcare · Medicine · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Prenatal Substance Exposure Effects · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |