The evolution of spectrum property regimes
Experiments with disruptive technologies in the U.S
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21519491 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Thomas W Hazlett (0000-0003-2492-266X, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 103223 |
| Publication date | 2026-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Telecommunications Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0308-5961 • E-ISSN: 1879-3258 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.telpol.2026.103223 |
| OpenAlex | W7164493006 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 13 |
Ronald Coase suggested a radical change in thinking about property rights in radio waves. Common pool problems in frequencies had been dealt with by regulatory allocations defining what services could be supplied. But the tradeoffs implicated in such market guidance were generally invisible to government spectrum managers. Coase theorized that ownership of tradeable frequency rights – now called exclusive, flexible-use spectrum access -- might improve the coordination sought. Policy experiments in emerging wireless networks then achieved consensus approval among economists in the 1980s and 1990s. By the 2000s, however, this new thinking was being challenged. Scientific progress was seen to engineer “smart radios” mitigating spectrum sharing conflicts. Technology changes often prompt changes in rights regimes. Unlicensed bands offering non-exclusive spectrum access for low-power devices have supported wi-fi and Bluetooth applications in wireless local area networks (WLANs), now ubiquitous in homes, offices, passenger jets and automobiles. Meanwhile, wireless wide area networks (WWANs) relying on liberal licenses, primarily distributed by auction and reconfigured in markets, have triggered a mobile revolution approaching 100% penetration globally; in 1975 there was one phone for every 12 persons. Both regulatory models incorporate mechanisms for spectrum sharing, delivering broadband Internet services hosting the “App Economy.” But which mechanisms are better choices when mutually exclusive band allocations are made? Here we analyze three policy experiments in which the U.S. Federal Communications Commission created regimes enabling non-exclusive spectrum access: Unlicensed PCS (U-PCS) launched in a proceeding beginning 1991; Television White Space devices (TVWS) developed in a spectrum allocation dating to 2002; and Citizens Band Radio Services (CBRS) developed via a rulemaking opening in 2009. “Dynamic spectrum sharing” in the form of “listen before talk” (LBT) or coordination by a “spectrum access system” (SAS) have been deployed in these governance frameworks, which are offered as models for current reforms. Seriously evaluated, that conclusion appears uncompelling
Broad spectrum · Disruptive technology · Frequency spectrum · Digital Platforms and Economics · History of Computing Technologies · ICT Impact and Policies
| Highly cited | No |
|---|