Optimal Abolition of FCC Spectrum Allocation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4029392 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Thomas W Hazlett (0000-0003-2492-266X, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia; Chief Economist of the Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C., corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 103-128 |
| Publication date | 2008-02-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Economic Perspectives (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0895-3309 • E-ISSN: 1944-7965 |
| Publisher | American Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1257/jep.22.1.103 |
| OpenAlex | W2102877151 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 24 |
Ronald Coase based his 1959 call for spectrum markets on theoretical conjecture. Today abundant evidence supports his case. Targeted liberalization in cellular markets, as contrasted with regulatory planning of the digital TV transition and other traditional policies, suggest enormous efficiency gains are available from wider use of "the price system." With exclusive frequency rights assigned to owners, markets widely reconfigure spectrum use, coordinating complex spectrum sharing. Resulting social gains include increased consumer surplus from enhanced technological innovation and wireless service competition. A social bonus arrives in the benefits associated with wider scope for free speech. Yet, the administrative allocation system continues to distribute rents and garner political support. Liberal reforms, in contrast, produce large but broadly dispersed efficiency gains and are undersupplied. This paper proposes an incremental extension of property rights in spectrum to move beyond the current rent-seeking equilibrium, eliminating the Federal Communications Commission's centralized spectrum allocation process and, with it, an "attractive nuisance" generating anticonsumer outcomes
Coase theorem · Cognitive radio · Commission · Economic rent · Economic surplus · Economics · Frequency allocation · Incentive · Law and economics · Liberalization · Market economy · Microeconomics · Politics · Property rights · Rent-seeking · Spectrum management · Telecommunications · Transaction cost · Wireless · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · ICT Impact and Policies · Law · Finance
Polycentric systems for spectrum management
The evolution of spectrum property regimes
A holistic framework for analyzing spectrum licensing models— illustrated by local licensing for 5G and 6G networks
Event Detection and Sharing in 6, 7, and 12 GHz Bands
Spectrum Sovereignty on Tribal Lands
Orbital congestion and satellite broadband competition
Marchés et allotissement
| Citations per year | 0.78 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Highly cited | No |