Fictionalism and Meinongianism

Bibliographic Data

ID21549567
AuthorsNathaniel Gan (0000-0002-9463-7955, The University of Sydney, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume36
Issue1
Pages49-62
Publication date2021-02-16
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTHEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0495-4548 • E-ISSN: 2171-679X
PublisherEHU Press (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1387/theoria.21727
OpenAlexW3117188289
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited12

Fictionalism about a kind of disputed object is often motivated by the fact that the view interprets discourse about those objects literally without an ontological commitment to them. This paper argues that this motivation is inadequate because some viable alternatives to fictionalism have similar attractions. Meinongianism—the view that there are true statements about non-existent objects—is one such view. Meinongianism bears significant similarity to fictionalism, so intuitive doubts about its viability are difficult to sustain for fictionalists. Moreover, Meinongianism avoids some of fictionalism’s weaknesses, thus it is even preferable to fictionalism in some respects

Epistemology · Linguistics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Artificial Intelligence

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