Is Meaning in Life Constituted by Value or Intelligibility

Bibliographic Data

ID21550424
AuthorsIddo Landau (0000-0002-6238-8632, University of Haifa, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume50
Issue1-2
Pages211-234
Publication date2021-05-04
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Papers (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0556-8641 • E-ISSN: 1996-8523
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/05568641.2021.1898288
OpenAlexW3166220559
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited23

Several authors have recently argued that intelligibility, rather than value, constitutes life’s meaning. In this paper I criticize the intelligibility view by offering examples of cases in which intelligibility and meaningfulness rates do not coincide. I show this for both meaning in life and meaning of life; under both naturalist and supernaturalist assumptions; and in ways relevant to subjectivists, objectivists, and hybridists. I show why the value view is not, in fact, vulnerable to several putative counterexamples to it, and I explain why, if value rather than intelligibility constitutes meaningfulness, there are so many cases in which intelligibility and meaningfulness rates do coincide. Finally, I explain why various arguments for the intelligibility view fail to show that it is advantageous to the value view

Epistemology · Linguistics · Sociology · Statistics · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychological Well-being and Life Satisfaction · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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