Kant and the Moral Need to Limit Theoretical Reason
An Expansion of Hare's Concept of Rational Instability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21571377 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul Kim (0000-0002-1755-6182, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada,), Paul J Kim (0000-0002-6186-6890, University of Toronto, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 74-83 |
| Publication date | 2024-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Toronto Journal of Theology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0826-9831 • E-ISSN: 1918-6371 |
| Publisher | University of Toronto Press Inc. (UTPress) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.3138/tjt-2023-0046 |
| OpenAlex | W4398173901 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 5 |
Why does Kant reject atheism in such strong terms despite his denial of the traditional proofs for the existence of God? I take the position that the question of atheism and the problem it entails are not a side issue but the recurring portrait of a figure that haunts Kant not just in the Religion, but throughout his critical philosophy. I seek to expand what Kant criticizes in atheism or, more accurately, to identify atheism as part of a collection of positions that Kant rejects on grounds of what John Hare calls “rational instability,” which is ultimately a moral-rational instability. This includes also certain forms of theism and theological beliefs. I claim that Kant's agenda is to construct a world view in which genuine moral behaviour is possible by preserving the world as a moral space in which individuals are free to be moral, and that the target of his metaphysical criticism is those who over-explain the world so as to deny the possibility of a meaningful self-consciousness of agency
Epistemology · Instability · Mathematical analysis · Physics · Quantum mechanics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |