To appease or to repress
How dictators use economic dynamics to increase their regime longevity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21584792 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Merel Harrijvan (0000-0002-7808-9688, corresponding author), Maartje Weerdesteijn (0000-0001-9205-8557) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 74 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 315-338 |
| Publication date | 2020-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Crime Law and Social Change (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0925-4994 • E-ISSN: 1573-0751 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10611-020-09911-4 |
| OpenAlex | W3043701316 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 53 |
International crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, are more likely to occur in non-democratic regimes. Consequently, the decision-making process of dictators has increasingly garnered criminological interest [78]. The decisions dictators make and the strategies they use impact the longevity of their regime. Scholars predominantly focus on the extent to which a dictator is able to generate support from both the elite and the masses in explaining regime survival [3, 22, 54]. A dictator can use economic dynamics to increase his support among the elite through corrupt practices [3], he can determine the extent to which he is supported by the masses by offering public goods and services to them [22] and he can withhold benefits to repress threats stemming from these groups [17]. However, the intentional use of these strategies to increase regime survival remains under-researched [77]. The present research aims to fill this gap through an analysis of Paul Biya’s 37-year reign in Cameroon. It is argued that the economic structure of a country influences the strategy—repression or appeasement—that is chosen to deal with the threat stemming from the masses or the elite and that ultimately, these considerations are likely to influence the economic development of a country
Democracy · Development economics · Dictator · Economics · Elite · Genocide · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Social unrest · Sociology · Corruption and Economic Development · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
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Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 1987
Economic theories of dictatorship
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African Growth Recurring
Eliminating Rivals, Managing Rivalries
Opposition and social-democratic change in Africa
Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion
Privatisation of agro‐industrial parastatals and Anglophone opposition in Cameroon
Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies
Cameroon's Neopatrimonial dilemma
Congo
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Political instability and growth in dictatorships
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Conflicting narratives of Anglophone protest and the politics of identity in Cameroon
Cities, Redistribution, and Authoritarian Regime Survival
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Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability
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Power, Genocide and Mass Murder
Cameroon's Democratic Crossroads, 1990-4
Rice Politics in Cameroon
Dictatorial Institutions and their Impact on Economic Growth
Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective
Understanding the Protest of February 2008 in Cameroon
Some Social Requisites of Democracy
No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955
Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media
The Tinpot and the Totalitarian
Rwanda and Ethiopia
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |