Mania, urgency, and the structure of agency
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21591981 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Elliot Porter (0000-0001-7124-6284, University of Birmingham, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 2819-2841 |
| Publication date | 2025-08-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2024.2342543 |
| OpenAlex | W4395070815 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 25 |
A debate persists over how to distinguish manic states from non-manic ones (such as depressions). A lacuna exists amongst these efforts, where a specifically agentive account of mania would sit. An agentive account centers the manic person’s view of practical reasons, rationalizing their actions in the same way that sympathetic understandings rationalize the actions of more neurotypical agents. In this paper, I argue that mania restructures our agency by creating a pervasive sense of urgency. This urgency changes the kind of handling that our practical reasons seem to call out for. Whilst this can make us less reliable as agents, I argue that this does not undermine the basic capacities on which personal autonomy is founded. The greater threat to manic agents’ autonomy is nonrecognition of this restructured agency, undermining autonomy in its social dimensions. Without an agentive account, we will fail to recognize distinctly manic agency when we see it, limiting our understanding of autonomy, and withholding recognition, fundamental to autonomy in its social dimensions, from manic agents
Bipolar disorder · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Mania · Mood · Psychoanalysis · Free Will and Agency · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychotherapy Techniques and Applications · Social Psychology
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason
Unprincipled Virtue
Responsibility from the Margins
Emotions, Values, and Agency
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry
Moral Luck
Three Dimensions of Autonomy
Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency
Games
The (Un)managed Self
Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem
Rethinking Relational Autonomy
Moral and Rational Commitment
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |