Is health philosophically distinctive
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 21592007 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Kengo Miyazono (0000-0003-4093-6877, Hokkaido University, autor correspondente), Tamaki Komada (Hokkaido University) |
| Ano | 2025 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 994-1005 |
| Data de publicação | 2025-04-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Editora | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2024.2379997 |
| OpenAlex | W4400929087 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 8 |
This commentary critically examines Barnes’ ameliorative skepticism about health, which is a distinctive form of skepticism. While we agree with Barnes that health is indeed messy, involving biological, normative, societal, and phenomenological factors in a complex manner that defies simplistic explanation, we do not think that health is messy in a distinctive way. We argue that health is in fact remarkably similar to another messy phenomenon that is familiar to philosophers (i.e. truth), and that an existing philosophical account of another messy phenomenon (i.e. pluralism about truth) can be applied to health
Cognitive science · Epistemology · Complementary and Alternative Medicine Studies · Empathy and Medical Education · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Psychology
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |