Science as intuition pump

Dennett’s methodological legacy for philosophy

Bibliographic Data

ID21592284
AuthorsJag Williams (Indiana University Bloomington, corresponding author), Ann‐sophie Barwich (0000-0003-0123-9366, Harvard University Press), Ann-Sophie Barwich (Indiana University Bloomington)
Year2026
Volume39
Issue3
Pages753-779
Publication date2026-04-03
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2025.2533883
OpenAlexW4412433134
LanguageEN
References cited40

We take a fresh look at Daniel Dennett’s naturalist legacy in philosophy, focusing on his rethinking of philosophical methods. Critics sometimes mistake Dennett for promoting a crude naturalism or dismissing philosophical tools like first-person intuition. We present his approach as more methodologically radical, blending science and philosophy in a way that treats inquiry as an evolving process. Concepts and intuitions are tested and adjusted in light of empirical findings and broader epistemic aims. For Dennett, science is not a limitation on philosophy, but a tool that sharpens it, with empirical data helping to refine our understanding both of concepts and philosophical phenomena alike. By exploring Dennett’s methodological contributions, we underscore the ongoing importance of his naturalist perspective in today’s philosophical landscape

Cognitive science · Epistemology · Experimental philosophy · Intuition · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Western philosophy · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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