Folk metaethics and error
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21592292 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Xinkan Zhao (0000-0002-9123-7921, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 2262-2284 |
| Publication date | 2024-11-16 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2022.2139231 |
| OpenAlex | W4307386232 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 53 |
Philosophers have in recent years displayed an increasing interest in investigating folk metaethical beliefs using rigorous empirical methods. Taken together, these studies put significant pressure on many philosophical theories that depend on the truth of folk moral objectivism, the view that the folk see morality as objectively grounded. Frequently included among the target of criticism is Mackie’s error theory, or more specifically the conceptual claim thereof. Finding this criticism misplaced, Benjamin Fraser tries to exonerate error theory from such accusation by distinguishing different senses of objectivity. In this paper, I show why Fraser’s strategy is not successful so that the pressure empirically brought upon classical error theory is genuine. However, I also argue that even on the new picture suggested by experimental studies, the folk still entertain erroneous beliefs, which, when coupled with plausible metasemantic assumptions and further empirical support, should warrant an error theory after all, though not in its classical form
Criticism · Epistemology · False accusation · Folk psychology · Morality · Objectivism · Warrant · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
Ethics
Unbelievable Errors
The Normative Web
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
The Myth of Morality
Ethical Intuitionism
The psychology of meta-ethics
Folk Moral Relativism
The Sources of Normativity
Beyond objectivism
The irrationality of folk metaethics
An empirical argument against moral non-cognitivism
The Influence of Social Interaction on Intuitions of Objectivity and Subjectivity
Intergroup tolerance leads to subjective morality, which in turn is associated with (but does not lead to) reduced religiosity
Moral Objectivism in Cross-Cultural Perspective
Metasemantics and boydian synthetic moral naturalism
Moral Realism
Language and Reality
Folk moral objectivism and its measurement
Why are some moral beliefs perceived to be more objective than others
Without God, everything is permitted? The reciprocal influence of religious and meta-ethical beliefs
Might All Normativity be Queer
Moral Realism
Choosing Normative Concepts
On the genuine queerness of moral properties and facts
Empirical research on folk moral objectivism
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |