Xinkan Zhao
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996352 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Xinkan Zhao |
| GIVEN NAMES | Xinkan |
| FAMILY NAME | Zhao |
| SIGNATURE | ZHAO X |
| AFFILIATIONS | Peking University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9123-7921 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Disagreeing with Opaqueness
Recently, Stina Björkholm proposed a novel solution to the problem of lost disagreement on behalf of metaethical contextualists. The solution builds on the notion of an opaque question, which admits of both affirmative and negative answers that are semantically compatible. In this article, I challenge the notion by showing that Björkholm’s arguments fail to establish the existence of such questions. I also argue that opaqueness, in its more ordin…
Folk metaethics and error
Philosophers have in recent years displayed an increasing interest in investigating folk metaethical beliefs using rigorous empirical methods. Taken together, these studies put significant pressure on many philosophical theories that depend on the truth of folk moral objectivism, the view that the folk see morality as objectively grounded. Frequently included among the target of criticism is Mackie’s error theory, or more specifically the concept…
Engineering Human Beauty with More Caution
Ravasio (2023) recently presents an interesting discussion of strategies to deal with lookism. He categorizes strategies into revisionary and redistributive ones and argues for a case against the former. This note is a critical response to both the taxonomy and the evaluation. I argue that the taxonomy needs to be improved and that the case against revisionary strategies cannot be maintained
The normativity objection and the coloring strategy
The Goal Problem in the "Now What" Problem
In this discussion note, I argue that the philosophers who propose solutions to the "now what" problem for error theory typically face a goal problem. The problem has its root in the argument they back up their proposal with, which is one of instrumental reason, consisting of two premises. First, we as normal agents have a certain set of goals; second, agents with this set of goals instrumentally should accept their proposal. I argue that when we…
Metasemantics and boydian synthetic moral naturalism
Metasemantics and boydian synthetic moral naturalism
The Goal Problem in the "Now What" Problem
In this discussion note, I argue that the philosophers who propose solutions to the "now what" problem for error theory typically face a goal problem. The problem has its root in the argument they back up their proposal with, which is one of instrumental reason, consisting of two premises. First, we as normal agents have a certain set of goals; second, agents with this set of goals instrumentally should accept their proposal. I argue that when we…
Folk metaethics and error
Philosophers have in recent years displayed an increasing interest in investigating folk metaethical beliefs using rigorous empirical methods. Taken together, these studies put significant pressure on many philosophical theories that depend on the truth of folk moral objectivism, the view that the folk see morality as objectively grounded. Frequently included among the target of criticism is Mackie’s error theory, or more specifically the concept…
Engineering Human Beauty with More Caution
Ravasio (2023) recently presents an interesting discussion of strategies to deal with lookism. He categorizes strategies into revisionary and redistributive ones and argues for a case against the former. This note is a critical response to both the taxonomy and the evaluation. I argue that the taxonomy needs to be improved and that the case against revisionary strategies cannot be maintained
The normativity objection and the coloring strategy
Disagreeing with Opaqueness
Recently, Stina Björkholm proposed a novel solution to the problem of lost disagreement on behalf of metaethical contextualists. The solution builds on the notion of an opaque question, which admits of both affirmative and negative answers that are semantically compatible. In this article, I challenge the notion by showing that Björkholm’s arguments fail to establish the existence of such questions. I also argue that opaqueness, in its more ordin…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works)