Disagreeing with Opaqueness
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22426493 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Xinkan Zhao (0000-0002-9123-7921, Peking University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 627-634 |
| Publication date | 2026-07-15 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1559-3061 • E-ISSN: 1559-3061 |
| Publisher | Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.26556/jesp.v31i4.6242 |
| OpenAlex | W7168368815 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
Recently, Stina Björkholm proposed a novel solution to the problem of lost disagreement on behalf of metaethical contextualists. The solution builds on the notion of an opaque question, which admits of both affirmative and negative answers that are semantically compatible. In this article, I challenge the notion by showing that Björkholm’s arguments fail to establish the existence of such questions. I also argue that opaqueness, in its more ordinary sense, can provide us with a promising way of solving the problem of disagreement. The opaqueness resides not in the nature of questions but in how speakers conceive of those questions.
Proposition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |