Habit, contingency, love
On Félix Ravaisson and Charles S. Peirce
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21597747 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tullio Viola (0000-0002-4327-9633, Max-Weber-Kolleg für kultur- und sozialwissenschaftliche Studien, Universität Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 966-986 |
| Publication date | 2020-09-02 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09608788.2020.1745751 |
| OpenAlex | W3014585672 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 13 |
This article proposes a comparison between one of the major figures of French spiritualism, Félix Ravaisson, and the pragmatist philosopher Charles S. Peirce. While there seems to be no direct historical connection between the two authors, their philosophies display striking similarities, in particular with regard to the link between the problem of habit and the problem of determinism. Both authors resort to habit when considering the role of chance, spontaneity, and final causation in nature, soon reaching the basic metaphysical issue of how to think about the relation between nature and spirit, or matter and mind. Moreover, they articulate their positions using concepts and metaphors that directly evoke the Christian notion of love. Yet Ravaisson and Peirce also appear to disagree on some fundamental issues. In particular, they have differing conceptions of the relation between habit and spontaneity. The article explores the implications of this disagreement and attempts to unearth its philosophical relevance
Causation · Contingency · Determinism · Epistemology · Habit · Metaphysics · Pragmatism · Supervenience · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology · Historical and Scientific Studies · Philosophical and Theoretical Analysis · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |