The Range of Moral Responsibility
A Beauvoirian Model
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21603019 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hannah Winckler‐Olick (0009-0001-3924-9853, Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University NY, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 206-217 |
| Publication date | 2026-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.70023 |
| OpenAlex | W4413908986 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 26 |
In this paper, I propose a view that extends the range of our core agency to include contributions our actions make to public values. This Extended Range View takes seriously Simone de Beauvoir's suggestion that values are not merely handed to us but created and shaped together by our actions. If we properly appreciate the moral weight of our contributions to the value systems that we all engage in—what I will call our evaluative landscape—then we can explain how we can be responsible for the free actions of others. This view significantly extends what we will need to think of as our responsibility (though not to a fully un restricted range). I will also suggest, however, that we accept a pluralist view about responsibility on which the way that we take responsibility and hold agents responsible for these kinds of value‐based contributions is different from the standard responsibility practices like blame, punishment, and guilt
Epistemology · Moral responsibility · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Materials Science · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Psychology · Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre
An essay on moral responsibility
Rethinking Existentialism
Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy
Analytic Existentialism
Living without Free Will
Responsibility and Control
Building Better Beings
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability
Eichmann in Jerusalem
Perspectives on Moral Responsibility
Agency, Complicity, and the Responsibility to Resist Structural Injustice
The Sources of Normativity
Moral Appraisability
Simone de Beauvoir's Notions of Appeal, Desire, and Ambiguity and their Relationship to Jean-Paul Sartre's Notions of Appeal and Desire
The Virtue of Taking Responsibility
Beauvoir and Sartre's "disagreement" about freedom
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |