Kant's Solution to the Trilemma of Concept Formation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21603166 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Erlewein (0009-0006-2655-410X, Seminar für Philosophische Grundfragen der Theologie Universität Münster Münster, Domplatz 6, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Publication date | 2026-01-22 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.70060 |
| OpenAlex | W7125481720 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 13 |
According to a widespread assumption, Kant's logical account of concept formation starts with comparison, where the latter involves concepts. On this assumption, the formation of a concept presupposes other concepts, so that the argument is threatened either by circularity, regress, or break‐off. In this paper, I argue that Kant did not hold the comparison‐first account that scholars typically attribute to him. Rather, he advocated an abstraction‐first account in which comparison is preceded by abstraction. Since the latter serves the generalization of marks and thus provides the general representations required for comparison, the abstraction‐first account does not run into the described trilemma
Generalization · Logical consequence · Logical form · Trilemma · Historical Philosophy and Science · Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations · Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Kant's Theory of Taste
On the textual authenticity of kant's logic
Der Begriff der Reflexion bei Kant
Blinde Anschauung
Kant on the Formation of Empirical Concepts
Three Kantian Accounts of Concept Formation
Kant and the Capacity to Judge
Kant on Marks and the Immediacy of Intuition
Kant on the Logical Origin of Concepts
The Poverty of Conceptual Truth
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |