Kant on the Logical Origin of Concepts
Kant on the Logical Origin of Concepts
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8098614 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alexandra Newton (0000-0002-7491-9728, Institut für Philosophie; Universität Leipzig; Germany, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 456-484 |
| Publication date | 2012-06-05 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00545.x |
| OpenAlex | W2097449821 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 15 |
In his lectures on general logic Kant maintains that the generality of a representation (the form of a concept) arises from the logical acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction. These acts are commonly understood to be identical with the acts that generate reflected schemata. I argue that this is mistaken, and that the generality of concepts, as products of the understanding, should be distinguished from the classificatory generality of schemata, which are products of the imagination. A Kantian concept does not provide mere criteria for noting sameness and difference in things, but instead reflects the inner nature of things. Its form consists in the self-consciousness of a capacity to judge (i.e. the Concept is the ‘I think
Abstraction · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Epistemology · Generality · Linguistics · Logical conjunction · Reflection (computer programming · Representation (politics · Computer Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,64 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2026 (12) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |