Bradley's Regress and a Problem in Action Theory

There is a problem which often arises during the course of various discussions in action theory and related fields about how exactly we are to characterise the relation which obtains between an agent and her (token) actions. An agent is a particular individual; it is often assumed that any token action of hers must be another.1 But what is the relation between these two particulars, when the agent is the agent of the action in question? Obviously, one asymmetric relation between them is this: the agent, S, is the agent of the action, A. But is there a further relation between agent and action in virtue of which it is correct to say that A is S's action? The idea that agency must be reducible to something assumed to be more basic, such as causation, has sometimes tempted philosophers to think so – and there are also fairly common locutions which can make it seem as though S's being the agent of an action, A might hold in virtue of another, perhaps more basic relationship – ‘execution’ or ‘performance’, or simply ‘doing’, for example. But as I shall try to show below, it is not at all easy to make any of these ideas work. In order to have a handy label for the problem which attaches to this search for a relation to undergird propositions of the form ‘S is the agent of A', I am going to call it the ‘agent-action problem’. The problem has rarely been acknowledged as a general difficulty – although it gives rise to various sub-problems, which have been often enough remarked upon.2 Moreover, even when the sub-problems are observed, they are sometimes noted merely as passing curiosities which perhaps constitute nothing more than minor linguistic inconveniences to the philosopher of action. In a way, then, neither the sub-problems nor the fundamental problem which in my view underlies the sub-problems has really received any serious, sustained scrutiny of a properly wide-ranging sort. In this paper, I want to suggest, however, that it deserves such scrutiny – and that a failure properly to get to grips with the general form of the problem is indicative of philosophy of action's failure to get a decent ontological understanding of its own subject matter. This failure, I believe, is connected to some of the puzzles in which philosophers find themselves embroiled, with respect to such issues as whether agents are causes of their actions3; whether the agent ‘disappears' in a problematic way from certain pictures of what action involves4; and which physical events, precisely, compose or constitute our actions.5 I want to argue that once we understand the true source of the agent-action problem, it can be seen that the problem is related in certain interesting ways to the philosophical difficulty which has come to be known as ‘Bradley's Regress'. The range of options for responding to it can, I think, therefore be usefully illuminated by reflecting on those that have been floated for dealing with that regress. Precisely parallel solutions to the two issues, I shall argue, are not necessarily available – because there are important differences between the two problems, differences relating to the fact that Bradley's Regress generates only a possibly tolerable infinity of universals, whereas parallel moves in the agent-action case generate more problematic-looking infinities of particulars. Nevertheless, some of the insights yielded by thinking about the source of Bradley's Regress seem highly relevant also to the agent-action case, and towards the end of the paper, I will make some suggestions about where the most hopeful resources for solving the agent-action problem In the of the paper, I shall try to what the agent-action problem and the difficulty simply be as a passing In the I shall Bradley's Regress and some for thinking that the agent-action problem is a of an in the of the paper, I shall that have been to Bradley's Regress and what their might be in the action case, in of a of the I shall also some for philosophy of action. is the agent-action The is that of the ways in which we might be tempted to about the relation we to our own really to philosophical to for a might be the it is often are we – and so they are one might think, to which we in the relation of – the relation that one might think be by the ‘S make to and of the we have – and it might seem to that these that we must be our actions. But as in her these we say that we be token actions. the of about in philosophers have to – of the form of my of the of are from what I shall call for I shall to be basic of the form – such as my the by of a which we might the a the subject an and an to with the of the there is of this we can those of the which seem to to particular actions. But these of be for in the ‘S I not my of my not of the and not of are we to think of where we it in such as as a it in is an what one might call – what philosophers often call an for the of the a are all on this understanding of the has that it is these the and not the which are the we of the I have this for are the make my my the But I have not my of my my of my and my of the one any of than a as an to the one an – the the the the going to it is that what going to going to simply be an action because the going to is not of a by the fact that any such action from There is something that going to even that something have a that But that that we the have to be of they be actions. Moreover, because is a in such it is not even true that we the relation to these that we in that relation to our token actions. my is the is as an merely to to the on the by the in my when I have a to in for these them when we want to in a general way about of this – I my the and of is and my the and some of the of the relevant even is not a relation which the agent to not agent to any more than it agent to not a in at common of the philosopher to about the relation between agents and is the philosophical it is are we can a relation – as it in such as the the But the of the in relation and so are not particular such as of or of or of Moreover, the which these are themselves action and can the by of the to which for are these particular for of the of the and of the once our for for is to the But then, all are by their as is being by our these will have themselves to be to which agents in a The will have to be what are we to say in general about of the of or which constitute their these of themselves they we are on a – being they will themselves have to be which are – and we have of of to But they are we a of they are not – a of a of the form where some of is not the of – in – that to an action when to our it is not easy to what the that of that not in fact to be as to which we in the relation of which to the of this particular to the relation between agents and actions. might be that one can also the in with the – for one can such as or a such as a might at to a and therefore to of the But when I a it is that the I of my in the way that the of my the is the I my is my of relation between and or is in the a by in with the a and a the an is and the not a the it to one of the that it to then, not a hopeful to be the relation which between agents and their – an a is merely a on the of an as for and the in this of in fact not to a relation by the agent to her action, simply the A which has been – and which a on the of the will is that are by their that the relation between agents and their is But this view has been to fairly perhaps the most from in the of a agents their we must the how they so – whether by or we say the a one which to the we in with the – we must our of our and our of our of and so we say the we are with the that agents their by some than the in of which we understand the of by agents – action on might an agent an action in such a way that her that action not to an action? we to have at the we not our because the not a relation at once the which it are properly and neither is in at some of its can be a relation – we that we particular or that we one of which is an and the of which to be a and to on there are to the and – I there they are merely to be of one or of the we have so so the of these will what is the relation between an agent and her action? is the such that a when and when A is her action? for some we are to a to this there is such how is that to be nothing seem to In the I want to the which has come to be known as ‘Bradley's and going on to that this will on the source of our we have been the what the relation is between an agent and her action. I want to for a to a that has received more in the way of philosophical what is the relation between a and its might the and or – have their the more or of or the in the that But of these we we will Bradley's a is for that it that a relation of between a and as But it between a and and there is as to think that a relation of must a and as there to think that a relation of must a and a relation between a and are on a to for that it that and in the relation But it there a to a relation of in the we are going to to a further this a to hold between and the and – a relation that we might call we are on a might think that although Bradley's Regress can be to of the of which have been with the of it is not that the on the problem I have been the agent-action problem at the in to a to the what the relation is between the subject of a and the or relation which its to The it is therefore an about the relation between a on the one and some of a or a on the not an about the relation between those and any particular such as token This is But my is that are between the thinking that to Bradley's and that which to our about the relation between agent and action. The parallel is that in the to what we to be the of an by some form of in with its and a on the one or or on the to the subject of the with the which our has in say about the relation between the subject of a and the by that we say about the relation between the subject of an action and the by its to that subject or the token action might be to be by that action regress. This to to constitute a of further must be that there are important differences between the two of – the one and the one particulars. is that at of the agent-action the that agent to action is the one – that the by the or In the on the we get a relation at because at a is a with as we the the which is in Bradley's is in the case of the action the of of the relevant – where we have not action of action and of her of action and so But the fact that the in these two are it that they are two of what is the problem – the difficulty one in to order to the between the of as one for the to or by the of whether those are and on the one or particular on the one what has sometimes been the of the and what one is with to be a of – which to be by of some further – and we find for in order to But the is that these can be in their so that the or relation they can an of The can be to I when I say that the in the course of our to what we to be the of an The that the of in the is by the that on which often in a philosophical to we with the fact that a particular is we as that we must what in the to make it In the case of Bradley's for we might the most with a such as is in to understand how might possibly on in the case of such a we might the so that we have something to to – and say that what the is that the has the of or or some such This is what the regress. our has the of is a – and the of can be by of we end with has the of the of this is in a and so are on the to infinity that In the case of action, a arises when we try to think about what might make an action the is more because there is more about what the relevant ontological be to view be that the ontological resources must at they also the resources as for the as is – that what a such as on the is a to – a that is by the to at one particular the of on the this I think, view about how to understand action for are by a of a at a and what an action is that such an A of view might be that we think of on the as being a – one which that the relation to the at some But those philosophers in the of token want to that even there is nothing with of the they further and that for the relation to the that is because there at some in the a particular action of a certain as it is often assumed in philosophy of that where that that must be in virtue of the of a or some such so it is assumed in philosophy of action that particular are for the understanding of the ontological of action There is in my view more to be for the of these than the But even the to be with we are at this in the and have the idea that we the of particular we will want to be to to the action which is the for our and we might a of in order to be to might for of on of the and say that in order for the to be has to have or this action. But this generates a as the to of the in the the we have by this her on of the are themselves action and so the of action to be by of the of which for we end with her of her on of the – and we are on a that is to the to which our it is that the for about the relation between agents and their which have themselves in that case have in the parallel that about how to of the between and their The and is a the and an which we to to I I have The I suggest, such as and – a that is not its which is by philosophers in a way, for philosophical then, the more can be to the relation of as in the that a its in that it is an to a of what the relationship as it – a more which to more about what exactly the relation in must be But whether or not the in the linguistic resources we in case to subject and one as there is a parallel between the agent-action problem and the by Bradley's regress. In the to and a relation between subject and has a in the it as though the will to be on the as we with – an of or of and of In the and of the paper, I want to to some of the have to Bradley's and to whether any a to the agent-action we think of Bradley's In this of the paper, I shall to the and what there is to be for their in the agent-action interesting it to is that one that to in the case of the as a to the agent-action it that although the two issues are the differences between them to which I am is that a way of any one that moves by the of and – must and not to have that our of the as a of various and must be to the view that there are in – that is one – a to have at in from the that as as one and at two of particular and – or universals, on something more a theory of the we this to the agent-action problem, that there are any agents or any and that at some an – that a of to which we only we are there is and more the then, I shall on from own as to how to to and at some of the that have been have an of what is to be the There is to their being in so a to this is to say even a is the is The to is the from to of is a all the further in the necessarily it not be that the for in the the of the fundamental is nothing more than the of I am to think that this is of the correct to Bradley's of as the to the of any universals, is one for the philosopher by Bradley's there are and there are and to be related to the which related by But it is to that there are or seem to about they seem to be to all of in the philosophy of and to a of ontological they to be in the is a form of about such can the that the of and that the relation of and so and therefore we about for our sometimes to of such But at the we that we are not these to in order to for our The of the as we is that this is our the which to the of the or relation will generate the for further which is as as to say that we the at for the But this not be our for in the of at some and are merely that to for that and in the relation is really an way of that is not a of the fact that is But the be for all There are such that to be a about and and the of an – which is as as to say that we not that can be the subject of their own The is true of In the to be true of the relation which to the they – for as it that as we to philosophical to be to about being as not being for any particular for this to a of of perhaps the is that we that this is and easy with the a by not that the of for and is not to constitute any of of what it the case that is for any and the for the agent-action we say that an of particular is all and we that they are for of the form ‘S merely of in ways about the of that we by of of the form ‘S I think it will not The has to with something I noted – and that is that we with a which to a relation between an agent and a particular action, the a form than in the case, in that the is of particulars, than of The difficulty with this is to we are thinking of as particular of the which for be with with physical of the we an action, the agent-action that we an infinity of – of which is a of these is to be with a the have it be that we an action, an of There is a in which the of is – the might seem tolerable because are and the about when one and not an often simply the of there is a which to that we an infinity of of of than the there be those simply so be of are is to that we to them simply as the of the by the of a regress. even we are not thinking of as the of that might be with or physical it that we the difficulty in thinking of as which to their in that we to the that can be their agents – and them as of the – that is to as for their on the agent of the action, must therefore be in any of the action. is not that we be any about the of which for S's of or her of of actions. to that we we generate an of such whether or not we are as The view that there is an infinity of particular on on which I is there is way of the agent-action problem, we The idea that we must or Bradley's Regress from in the is perhaps the most form of to the it – although there is a of the particular of this that have been There is not for an of the and of the range of that have been – I shall some of the some general on which of these solutions most for those by the agent-action noted is an to Bradley's Regress – it is not that merely as the that there are universals, will with the agent-action as remarked the agent-action problem generates an infinity not of universals, of particular – and the will to to those to a is will not want to particular events, any more than they want to – in a that is the – which is simply that is not going to the agent-action problem, we want to an of particular actions. the is a we find a relation that of This the that the relation of is a the and the This is not the the of the it about that the in the with the the of any But to be is not an because it that they really are and can be the of A have to be – which that we about the for – that it be the subject in a not be a it we have difficulty at all about I am it for example. is that this can really what we in the way of a to the regress. A more hopeful to my has been by and in an interesting way by The idea is we as an in something to the to the of a such as is or to the of a from to form in where the in order to the is not this is any of its In is for we that to a particular and also that to the of But in to to and there is a in the the which has of its own and therefore be to be to the two by of some is the as it than the which is merely of a to be by a to an is which with an to a This of the problem of the by that of the of to and which are therefore available to be in further of which they the what we to make of But an – the – and have about whether or not the be to have – that we that it to the relation and that we can Bradley's Regress as the of its as the of it from my with action to to between these two of the I shall to the whether the that be as some which is the source of its to say can what to say about the agent-action the show in an action with an action of the form ‘S the that there are two in this which to an and which to an think that action to particular further and that we think of action as in perhaps in virtue of the of the and of the to the of a particular A of the form ‘S will that the of the by way of the of at one particular an action, of which is the agent, or which is But about the in this is to a with what of the in the form as it in it the by to the – that of the of the by of a is a which is in that it be as a relation – it not subject and agent and action. we think of or the as a we make the that we make we of the by the as – the that to Bradley's The of the is that we a way to that there is an in that and merely the between subject and that the But in an action at we such as to particular this in the which are to those particular by such as their so we simply a or to say what the relation is between and on of the those themselves to the – and so the once by the of which are in their by those and so on I believe, then, that we are to in the of the a way to the agent-action problem arises because the relationship between agent and action is in to be as a relation at all – what its to is not a what one might call – an with a and connected to the of subject perhaps being that an action in the There are of course in – they are between agents and which are properly of those There is also the and as I think of relation ‘S is the agent of But there is in to such as a relation which can be by a for and my of an a which something about that in virtue of which I am the agent of my There because there can be nothing to undergird the which are of for a of events, there to be way to say how an agent to her action than to say that it is The relation between agent and action is by the in for – the find a of it not seem to be our the in those we in the action being and not in it been or by The of which is not the relation that can be by the – the relation which I can to such as my or my only a and relation to in that is more the of which to the way in which such as my or my be I not own my or my – that is not the in which they are are not the fact that there is way to say how an agent to an action than to say that it is in this is that – as by the fact that we them to by any of the we have – and are that so as be by way of the agent they this we might have to that from it – for we have to on agent causation, as not their and might also have to on the idea that might be in physical – any more than a or be – they not have the of as that might make that But perhaps this is the way also to the problem of the will not from any of action which properly the fact that are – not which merely in to those agents they The that are not and that we of them only in order to the various ways in which agents make their the in an of philosophy where is

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